Moral equality of combatants and consent to be targeted

In this article I will argue that the moral equality of combatants is not implied by their consenting to be targeted. Early on, distinction between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello will be made in order to begin to determine what is meant by the moral equality of combatants. Michael Walzer’s claims will then be explored, and countered by Jeff McMahan, which will in turn support the overarching viewpoint that combatant consent is far from automatically implied, with certain conditions in mind. Arguments for the suggestion of moral equality will be countered by discussion against it, and a proposed breakdown of moral equality will in turn quash the implication of combatants consenting to be targeted.

Just War Tradition has cemented itself, and developed through time, between international powers from as far back as the fourth century. At this time, St Augustine of Hippo asserted that ‘…the pursuit of peace must include the option of fighting for its long-term preservation.’ (Catholic, n.d.). This was the stepping stone for an attempt to be made to define the conditions under which a just war could be possible. Historically, war is judged to be just or unjust based on the Just War Tradition which now sets the conditions used by kings, queens and governments or global powers to determine each designation.

Two groups of conditions have derived from the Just War Tradition, via just war theorists. Jus ad Bellum (JaB) relates to the justifiability when entering into war. This is associated with the politicians and representatives in power who make such a choice. Jus in Bello (JiB) relates to the conduct of war and is fundamentally associated with combatants. JaB and JiB are mutually exclusive, with distinctly split groups. This difference can be described by a soldier not being responsible for the war; JaB, but he or she is responsible for their own conduct within said war; JiB (Pike, 2007. p. 11). The main conditions set in JiB primarily dictate that one must fight in proportion to the circumstance. Also, fighters must adhere to the principle that non-combatants are immune to direct attack. These conditions must be abided by ‘For the legitimacy of the conduct of war…’ (Pike, 2007. p. 12). In doing so, the idea of a form of symmetry materialises between combatants.

In this traditional sense, where conditions in JiB are met on both sides, each of these sides ‘…have the same rights, the same permissions, the same liabilities…’ (McMahan, 2006) as one-another. Combatants are able to kill, or be killed in a conflict and each side poses a very real threat to the other on a direct basis. Therefore suggesting that moral qualities between the combatants are considered as identical, regardless of the justification of the war in which they both partake. This implied belief is clearly supported by Michael Walzer in his book Just and Unjust Wars.

Walzer’s work in Just and Unjust Wars attempts to align just war theory with present times and philosophical understanding. He does so by means of studying historical examples in order to use them ‘…to illuminate what is commonly understood about the morality of war.’ (Pike, 2007. p. 15). Walzer claims that the Just War Tradition, where both sides are conforming to the same rules, make combatants ‘morally equal’ (Pike, 2007. p. 42). The Just War Tradition is enabled by the conditions set in JaB and JiB. It maintains the idea that combatants can be excluded from the justification of a war, yet have the inherent right to kill or be killed due to their participation. Nonetheless, more suited to the reasoning of this article, his view can be more distinctively summed up by the logical notion of liable symmetry. In this key respect, unjust and just combatants who are equally liable to be killed and are authorised to kill, portraying a sense of liable symmetry. However, the more traditional sense for the moral equality of combatants is its own undoing. The classical sense of merely posing a threat should not immediately make one consenting to be targeted.

Jeff McMahan answers to Walzer by relying on fictitious constructed thought experiments in order to isolate particulars for discussion and to draw on specific viewpoints, as opposed to historic events. McMahan himself states ‘I think that the moral equality of combatants just can’t be true.’ (2006). When considering how a just defending combatant fights against an unjust aggressor, it is difficult to accept that both sides have equal rights, liabilities, and permissions. One could argue that they still pose a threat to one-another. This may be so but the non-instigating defender is taking action for the action taken upon it. This is much akin to an armed offender gaining entry to a family home only to be confronted by an armed inhabitant. In agreement with McMahan, ‘People don’t lose moral rights by justifiably defending themselves or other innocent people against unjust attack.’ (McMahan, 2006. p. 379). As such, the inhabitant does not lose his moral right not to be killed and would certainly not consent to being targeted either.

For McMahan the difficulty lies with accepting that in this case the offender has equal rights and permissions to the defender, which in turn directly criticises Walzer’s view of moral equality. If a defender has merely taken up arms it does not automatically brand them as consenting to be targeted. The defender is liable to take defensive action as a direct result of an aggressor taking offensive action(s). Escalating this further, assume now that the armed offender becomes a tribe of armed offenders gaining entry to a village and encounters defensive action. The same outcome applies again, as would it on a state on state attack. These encounters would not make both sides morally equal, and the defending person, village, or state would not automatically consent to being targeted. They are both symmetrical in the ‘liable to take action’ sense, but no other.

There is an argument that, according to Thomas Hurka, combatants make themselves ‘…liable to attack by joining up’ (Pike, 2007. p. 59), and waive their inherent right not to be killed by doing so. Conversely, this is implying that all soldiers join up in order to attack and in doing so waive the right not to be attacked. With that in mind, new entrants who join the British Army attest an oath of allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen, which has been in place for many decades. This oath bears the declaration ‘I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully defend Her Majesty, her heirs and successors in person…’ (Oath of Allegiance (UK), 2014). Serving British soldiers swear an oath to defend from the onset. Should they find themselves looking through their weapon sights at a target in defence, this does not automatically imply that they consent to being targeted themselves.

This viewpoint may be seen as biased and as such a counter argument is needed. Figure 1.0 (Neuville, 1880) below shows the Battle of Rorke’s Drift, otherwise known as the Defence of Rorke’s Drift. This took place during colonial Britain, as such the British were ultimately the unjust invading force here. The men in this picture knew the enemy were there to destroy them and, in this case, the Zulu warriors are perceived as a just enemy. With this example, Walzer would promote the moral equality of combatants on both sides, as they both pose a threat to each other. Hurka would express his ‘waive’ of their right not to be killed view because these men joined the Army in the first place. With present day knowledge of those circumstances in mind; McMahan would continue with his ‘impermissible’ equality claim because one side is justified and the other is unjustified. No viewpoint suggests the defending men consent to being targeted. It is impractical to assume that the British knew of their unjust endeavour and/or support it as such. It is however reasonable to accept that some or all of them could have joined up under the premise of never anticipating to actually find themselves in the life and death situation depicted.

In addition to this, the soldiers did not have a full understanding of the morality of their presence in South Africa, as is generally accepted in the epistemological argument (Pike, 2007. p. 55). Global affairs, and the morality of such, are far too complicated for combatants at an individual level to reasonably be expected know and understand ‘…and so consequently they cannot know about the justness of their cause…’ (Pike, 2007. p. 55). Therefore, they are permitted to trust superiors and obey their orders as if supporting a just cause. What the combatants know in Figure 1.0 is that they are being attacked and their objective is to defend themselves and each other from an aggressor. It cannot be assumed that they all consent to being targeted. They consent to defend as a military duty and have done so since they volunteered to join up.

Figure 1.0 The Defence of Rorke’s Drift, 

by Alphonse de Neuville depicting the height of battle.

A present day operational soldier does not pose a constant threat all day and all night. They are almost always unarmed or in a low state of readiness. According to Hurka’s take in just war theory, this makes him an indirect threat and ‘…people who pose second­ order threats are liable to be killed.’ (Pike, 2007. p. 77). Soldiers may find themselves patrolling the streets of a hostile village being watched from two hundred meters away by a local enemy leader. The leader has their finger hovering over the activation switch of a remote-controlled improvised explosive device buried beneath the feet of the soldier. In this example they both have proportionate weapon systems capable of killing, they both pose a threat to one-another, and there will be no collateral damage. This should not suggest that the situation has two morally equal combatants who consent to being targeted. The leader has a device that is intended to kill, the soldier holds a weapon for self-protection and the protection of the local civilian population. Thus, posing a second-order threat should not demonstrate liability and does not elicit consent to be targeted.

It is now possible to suggest, then, that combatants fighting for unjust causes follow orders, have trust in their superiors, and have faith in JaB justifiability. They are not personally responsible for the instigation of their aggression. For these reasons; an unjust combatant can be regarded as an attacker. Combatants fighting for just purposes participate because they become a defending force repelling an unjust aggressor. Their physical action has been necessitated by the occurrence of the aggressor. To that avail, a just combatant can be regarded as a defender.

Morally, the individual human behaviour of attackers and defenders cannot be regarded as equal. While their actions may well be conducted correctly on both sides in accordance with the conditions set in Jus in Bello, these two sides are anything but equal on moral terms. The ethical choice and resulting actions from each side cannot be morally identical. Ergo, an attacker must concede that they attack whilst being liable to retaliation, a defender however would therefore never accept that they consent to being targeted prior to or during an engagement.




Bibliography

Catholic Online (n.d.) St. Augustine of Hippo [Online]. Available at http://www.catholic.org/saints/saint.php?saint_id=418 (Accessed 16 September 2021).

McMahan, J. (2006) ‘On the moral equality of combatants’, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 377–93.

Nouville, A. (1880) The Defence of Rorke's Drift [Painting]. Art Gallery NSW, Australia.

Pike, J. (2007) Political Philosophy A-Z, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press.

Wikipedia (2014) Oath of Allegiance (UK) [Online], 1 December 2014. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oath_of_Allegiance_(United_Kingdom) (Accessed 16 September 2021).