Moral equality of combatants and consent to be targeted
In this article I will argue that the moral equality of combatants is not implied by their consenting to be targeted. Early on, distinction between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello will be made in order to begin to determine what is meant by the moral equality of combatants. Michael Walzer’s claims will then be explored, and countered by Jeff McMahan, which will in turn support the overarching viewpoint that combatant consent is far from automatically implied, with certain conditions in mind. Arguments for the suggestion of moral equality will be countered by discussion against it, and a proposed breakdown of moral equality will in turn quash the implication of combatants consenting to be targeted. Just War Tradition has cemented itself, and developed through time, between international powers from as far back as the fourth century. At this time, St Augustine of Hippo asserted that ‘…the pursuit of peace must include the option of fighting for its long-term preservation.’ (Catholic, n.d....